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This thesis presents factors relevant to determining a design professional's liability
for inaccurate cost estimates. A study of the literature of/related to different types of
estimating methods was performed to determine what other authors have stated the
accuracy to be for the respective type of estimate. Standard form contract documents of
the American Institute of Architects and Engineers Joint Contract Document Committee
were compared to determine the design professional's duties in meeting the requirements
of the contract. Appellate court cases dealing with disputes involving inaccurate cost
estimates were identified and evaluated to determine the key and consistent issues and
rules applied by the courts.
The cases are arranged by the primary interpretation rule which was instrumental
in determining the outcome. The objective is to develop a flow diagram that owners and
design professionals can use as an interpretive guide to assist them in understanding their
requirements and liabilities for cost estimates. By formulating this basis of understanding
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO COST ESTIMATE DISPUTES
For which ofyou, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth
the cost, whether he have sufficient tofinish it? Luke 14:28
Cost estimates are of concern to both owners and design professionals. The
owner must be able to determine the amount of funds required for a project. Many times,
the owner will provide the design professional with the requirements for a project and use
the preliminary estimate submitted by the design professional as the basis for financing. In
doing this, the owner may not understand that when a design professional submits an
estimate, unless otherwise stated, it is just an estimate, not a firm cost or a guarantee
Therein lies the initial confusion and misunderstanding. On the other hand, a design
professional is faced with the task of preparing cost estimates throughout various phases
of the project with changing requirements, changing economic factors, and varying
degrees of information. Even so, the design professional is being paid for a service, and is
held to a standard of someone who can make a reasonable estimate to the cost of a project
based on knowledge about the construction industry. The extent of a design professional's
liability to an owner for inaccurate cost estimates is an issue which professional
organizations have tried to minimize. However, the inclusion of exculpatory contract
language may not protect the design professional who haphazardly or negligently performs
duties regarding cost estimates.
BACKGROUND
Professional organizations such as The Engineers Joint Contracts Document
Committee (EJCDC, 1984) and The American Institute of Architects (AIA, 1987) have

attempted to limit the design professional's liability for inaccurate cost estimates by
placing exculpatory language in their standard contracts. Sweet states that "the length and
complexity of the contract language demonstrates the seriousness of the problem" (Sweet,
1994, p. 192). For example, AIA Document B141, paragraph 5.2.1 titled "Responsibility
for Construction Cost" states:
Evaluations of the Owner's Project budget, preliminary estimates of Construction
Cost and detailed estimates of Construction Cost, if any, prepared by the
Architect, represent the Architect's best judgment as a design professional familiar
with the construction industry. It is recognized, however, that neither the
Architect nor the Owner has control over the cost of labor, materials or
equipment, over the Contractor's methods of determining bid prices, or over
competitive bidding, market or negotiating conditions. Accordingly, the Architect
cannot and does not warrant or represent that bids or negotiated prices will not
vary from the Owner's Project budget or from any estimate of Construction Cost
or evaluation prepared or agreed by the architect. (AIA, 1987)
Even with this seemingly unambiguous language, the design professional may not
be completely free from liability. In the case of Malo v. Gilman, 379 N.E.2d 554
(1978), the Court of Appeals of Indiana found that the architect, Malo, could not recover
fees for a project where the bids were greater than 50% of the preliminary estimate.
Contrary to this opinion, in the case of Griswold and Rauma, Architects, Inc. v.
Aesculapius Corp., 221 N.W.2d 556 (1974), the court found that the design professional
could recover fees for a project where the low bid (after negotiations) exceeded the
agreed cost estimate by 13%.
The percentage of the bid cost versus the estimated cost however is just one of the
factors considered by the courts. The courts also review the actions of the parties during
performance of the contract, whether the owner caused the difference in cost by making
changes to the project scope, maximum price restrictions (express or implied), and the
method in which the design professional prepared the cost estimate. In the case of
Williams Engineering, Inc. v. Goodyear, Inc., 496 So. 2d 1012 (1986), the design
professional was found liable for damages "by failing to employ a professional estimator.

not examining other similar projects (the project was to design a water slide), not advising
the owners about other contractual arrangements, and not providing revised cost
estimates." 496 So. 2d 1012 (1986)
From the owner's perspective, the meaning of the terms and contract language
may cause confusion. For example in AIA Document B 141, the contract requires the
architect to provide cost estimates at various phases of the contract under the basic
responsibilities, but also states that a "detailed cost estimate" is an additional service. An
owner may be confused about why he should pay an additional fee for a "detailed cost
estimate" when the estimate in his opinion was part of the original agreement. Sweet
describes two models used by design professionals to prepare cost estimates; a traditional
model where projected areas are applied to rules of thumb based on the design
professional's experience (example, cost/square foot of building), and a "fine tuned"
model where the estimate is based on much more detail (Sweet, 1994, p. 193). An owner
may not understand what information is required, the methodology used by design
professionals in preparing cost estimates, or the difference between a cost estimate and a
"detailed cost estimate" Furthermore, design professionals view cost estimates as an
educated guess whereas an inexperienced owner may perceive a cost estimate as a fact to
be relied upon (Sweet, 1994, p. 194).
If the cost estimate proves to be inaccurate at bid opening, it may mean revising
the scope, re-solicitation, or even cancellation of the project. This can cause damage to an
owner who relies on the cost estimate to support timely project delivery. An owner may
question why he or she should have to pay the design professional fee when in the owner's
opinion, the design professional did not perform one of their duties satisfactorily.

PROBLEM STATEMENT
It is not clear how courts decide cases involving inaccurate cost estimates What
are the theories of recovery from which owners and design professionals bring suit 9 What
is the magnitude of error between the estimated cost and the low bid which the courts
apply to decide if the design professional can be held liable9 How do the courts view
maximum price conditions9 What actions by the owner would cause the courts to rule in
favor of the design professional? These questions will be researched to develop better
understanding.
OBJECTIVE
This research will define the conditions under which a design professional can be
held liable to an owner for inaccurate cost estimates. In making this determination, the
methodologies used in preparing cost estimates will be described with respect to standard
contracts published by the Engineers Joint Contracts Document Committee (EJCDC), the
American Institute of Architects (AIA), and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC). The research will include an examination of the requirements for submitting
cost estimates during each phase of the contract. The research will examine how courts
have viewed the difference between the cost estimate and bid costs and will determine the
general percentage that would constitute liability for the design professional under
ordinary circumstances. Other factors and special circumstances that have proven relevant
in court decisions will also be examined, such as scope changes, economic factors,
information available, maximum price restrictions, and timing, that might affect the liability
determination. By identifying the relevant facts, a decision diagram will be developed to
be used as a guide to owners and design professionals in understanding the requirements
regarding cost estimates, and how appellate courts have applied the law in similar
situations.

VALUE OF THE WORK
The Navy Civil Engineer Corps finances graduate education under the Graduate
Education Program. A requirement of this research is that the topic must be applicable to
construction engineering and management problems found in the Navy facilities business.
The Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) awards a large number of design
professional contracts each year. NAVFAC, which functions in capacities as both owner
and design professional, will benefit from this research by gaining a better understanding
of how the courts have viewed the relevant factors and applied rules in determining design
professional liability regarding cost estimates. In addition, the results may reveal where
changes need to be made to the contracts between the Navy and design professionals.
This research is beneficial to both the Navy, and civilian owners and design professionals.
TASKS
To complete the research, the following tasks were completed:
1
.
Identify the standard methods used in industry in the preparation of cost estimates
based on the requirements of standard documents published by AIA, EJCDC, and
NAVFAC
2. Conduct a legal literature review and collect appellate court cases that relate to
cost estimates.
3. Analyze the court cases to identify factors that are relevant and how the law has
been applied to these facts.

4. Develop a flow diagram to be used as an interpretive guide for owners and design
professionals to assist in understanding the importance of cost estimates and how
the courts have treated similar situations.
5. Evaluate the accuracy of the flow diagram by testing selected sample cases.
METHODOLOGY
The following approach was taken:
1
.
Identify the standard methods used in industryfor the preparation of cost estimates
based on the requirements of standard documents published by AIA, EJCDC, and
NAITAC. The contract language of the standard documents published by AIA, EJCDC,
and NAVFAC was reviewed and compared with respect to requirements of each
document. A literature search was conducted to establish the methods design
professionals use to meet these contract requirements. Industry methods for preparing
and adjusting the cost estimates for the different phases (Schematic Design Phase, Design
Development Phase, Construction Documents Phase, Bidding Negotiation Phase and
Construction Phase) of AIA Document B141 were evaluated. The industry methods of
estimating were evaluated to determine the difference between the cost estimates provided
by the design professional in the Basic Services and the "detailed cost estimate
11
provided
by the Additional Services in AIA Document B 141
.
2. Conduct a literature review and collect appellate court cases that relate to cost
predictions A literature search was conducted using the LIAS system in The
Pennsylvania State University library. In locating relevant court cases, the West Reporter
System was used to include West's Descriptive Word Method, Topic Method, and Table
of Cases Method. The American Law Reports, West's Corpus Juris Secundum, Shepard's

System, NAVFAC Office of Counsel, and the LEXIS system were also used It is
worthwhile to note that access to large electronic legal database services such as LEXIS
and WESTLAW have made legal research a much more efficient operation. Another tool
which could have been used extensively in conducting a literature review and gaining
information (not used due to late discovery by the author) is use of the internet. As it
turned out, a simple statement in the form of electronic mail stating the research being
conducted, and an inquiry for information sent to an easily obtained distribution list of
interested parties yields names of authors, publications, academics, etc. that have
knowledge of the subject.
3. Analyze the court cases to identifyfactors that are relevant and how the law has been
applied to the facts. Once the literature and court cases were collected, each case was
evaluated by identifying the rules that were used by the courts in deciding the case. The
cases were then reviewed as a group to identify rules that are common among the
decisions.
4. Develop a series of rules or questions to be used as an interpretive guidefor owners
and design professionals to assist in understanding the importance of cost estimates and
how the courts have treated similar situations. Once the common relevant factors were
identified, a flowchart was developed that owners and design professionals can use as an
interpretive guide to assist them in understanding their requirements and liabilities for cost
estimates.
5. Evaluate the accuracy of the flow diagram by testing selected sample cases. The
diagram was tested by interpreting selected cases that were not yet analyzed, and
obtaining the same interpretation as the courts. The diagram was developed to help
owners and design professionals understand their liabilities and responsibilities that are
applicable in most situations.

ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 defines various types of
estimates, accuracy of these estimates, and compares the estimating requirements of
standard contracts. Chapter 3 defines the legal theories that are used in bringing suit for
cases involving cost estimates. Chapter 4 identifies the primary rules that are used in
intepretation of cases involving inaccurate cost estimates, examines the rule "actions of the
parties", and identifies the estimate percent error that constitutes gross negligence in
contracts that contain a cost limit. Chapter 5 identifies cases that were decided using the
rule "read the contract as a whole", and provides a decision diagram for interpreting cases
involving cost estimates. Chapter 6 contains the thesis summary and conclusions.

CHAPTER 2
TYPES OF COST ESTIMATES
Cost estimating is a general term given to estimates of many types, methods, which
vary in accuracy Among authors of cost estimating texts, there are inconsistencies in the
terminology used to define cost estimates For example, one author might describe a
conceptual estimate as conceptual, order of magnitude, cost per unit area or capacity
Another author might characterize this type of estimate as a screening or budget estimate.
Although the terminology is not always consistent, there is consistency in the information
used in preparing each type of estimate. In describing the information that is used for
different types of estimates, definitions are helpful. The definitions provided are
compilations from several published sources on cost estimating. The terminology used for
each type of estimate seems to be most common among the various sources cited.
ESTIMATING TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS
Cost Estimating - the process of predicting the cost of a project using available
information.
Top-down estimate - approach to estimating cost that is based on an owner or design
professional using a cost per unit or order or magnitude method based on requirements
and information provided. Approach can become increasingly accurate as design decisions
are finalized however no detailed quantity take-offs are taken or actual quotes from
subcontractors received Typically, preliminary estimates use the "top-down" method
(Stewart, 1995, p. 671).
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Bottom-up estimate - also known as detailed or "grass roots" estimate. Developed by
performing a detailed, in-depth analysis of material prices, labor and equipment rates,
quantities, overhead, and profit, and by collecting quotes from various sub-contractors
that will be performing work (Stewart, 1995, p. 677)
Feasibility estimate - a "top down" estimate performed in the planning/evaluation phase
(Clark. 1997, p. 27) for the purpose of the owner to determine whether or not the project
should be built Construction is only one part which includes such things as land, design,
tax depreciation, investment tax credit, capital gains, annual maintenance and repairs,
financing, and return on investment; A preliminary estimate is "sometimes based on
functional requirements such as cost per pupil, cost per parking space, cost per bed, cost
per kilowatt hour, etc . Estimated cost can be measured by indices such as Time
Referenced Cost Indices and Cost-Capacity Factors (Barrie and Paulson, 1992. p 201). It
is also referred to as a screening, or planning estimate. Information used for the estimate
might be size, capacity, location, and description.
Budget Estimate - performed during the preliminary design after the owner has completed
planning work, screened options, and is in a position to seek management approval to
proceed in developing the project (Clark, 1997, p 31).
Conceptual estimate - a "top-down" estimate also known as an order of magnitude,
ballpark, cost per unit area or capacity, systems, or comparison estimate A conceptual
estimate can be based on functional requirements as described in "Feasibility estimate"
above, but more often described by using parameters, systems, square foot, or cubic foot
costs taken from sketch drawings, outline specifications and other information available
(Sinclair, 1989, p. 3). This type of preliminary estimate seems to be what is contemplated
in the Schematic Design Phase of AIA Document B 141 Conceptual estimates are used as
a factor to aid in evaluating various conceptual design solutions (Sinclair, 1989. p 3)
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Design Development Estimate - a "top-down" preliminary estimate based on detailed
working drawings which aids in confirming that the proposed design is still within budget
This estimate is more refined than a conceptual estimate but not as refined as a definitive
or detailed cost estimate. More information is available for preparation, such as quantities
of material and required labor, using unit prices. Although the flexibility is reduced, the
design team can still make changes if the owner revises the budget (Sinclair, 1989, p. 4)
Preliminary Estimate - a "top-down'
1
estimate that is ordinarily prepared during the
various phases of design of a project. The estimate becomes increasingly accurate as
decisions are made regarding design, and increasing levels of information become available
from drawings, specifications, market conditions, etc
Parametric Cost Estimating - also known as statistical, "top-down" estimating, formula
estimating, or systems estimating (Stewart, 1995, p. 705). Cost is measured for the entire
job using certain major or physical characteristics, or "parameters", with the relationship
to cost as developed by studies of past jobs and characteristics (Stewart, 1995, p. 706). A
technique that employs one or more estimating relationships for measurement of costs
based on technical, physical, or other characteristics An example of an overall parameter
for a warehouse might be "gross enclosed floor area" (Barrie and Paulson, 1992, p 208)
Definitive Cost Estimate - sometimes called an engineer's estimate This estimate is
based on detailed working drawings and specifications, 'and is sometimes used to provide
the owner with an accurate forecast of actual cost with respect to the budget (Barrie and
Paulson, 1992, p. 212). A definitive estimate is a prefinal estimate developed just prior to
the production of final drawings and specifications This type of estimate would typically
be provided as the last refinement prior to bid opening. .Although refined, a definitive
estimate still encompasses a "top-down" approach based on parameters (ex. $/lf of wall)
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Detailed Cost Estimate - sometimes called bid estimate (Sinclair, 1989, p. 5). A "bottom -
up" method of cost estimating characterized by a thorough, in-depth analysis of all tasks,
components, processes, and assemblies (Stewart, 1995, p. 677). This method
encompasses a quantity take-off whereby the material, detailed labor hours, and
equipment usage are identified, and separated by division and specification section.
Detailed estimates can be separated into two categories: fair cost estimates (prepared by
design professionals) and contractor's bid estimates. The difference is the design
professional's estimate may not include lump-sum subcontract quotations, and may
contain a simplified number of line items (ex. the contractor might separate overhead,
profit and contingency) (Barrie and Paulson, 1992, p. 211) AJA Document B141 lists the
provision of a detailed cost estimate as an "Optional Additional Service."
ACCURACY
A study of estimating accuracy from several publications, listed by author and type
of estimate, in order of increasing accuracy, is shown in Table A-l A review of Table A-
l shows there are consistencies in the literature regarding the accuracy of different types
of estimates From the data in Table A- 1, a range of accuracy can be shown for each
estimate type. Table A-2. In general, an early feasibility or screening estimate should be
40 percent accurate. As more information becomes available, the conceptual or order of
magnitude estimate is developed which should be 15 to 35 percent accurate The degree
of accuracy of the detailed estimate is most consistent among the literature with a range of
accuracy below 10 percent.
Figure 1 shows graphically the increase in accuracy for each successive type of
estimate The level of accuracy shown for a detailed estimate is quite small, however, it
should be noted that it is generally recognized that significant effort is required to obtain
only a few percentage points of accuracy when going from a definitive estimate to a
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detailed cost estimate. For example, Atlantic Division Naval Facilities Engineering
Command requires detailed cost estimates be provided with each submittal for contracts
with design professionals. Realizing that each situation is different, it may or may not be
beneficial to an owner such as the U.S. Navy, to pay the large amount of additional cost
for only a small gain in the degree of accuracy Perhaps the requirement by the Navy for
detailed cost estimates is due to the need for strict compliance with acquisition
regulations, the long budgeting process and fear of "busting the budget", or potential
impact to operational forces that could be caused by delays in the delivery of Navy
facilities due to reprogramming for additional funding It should also be mentioned that
although many authors describe accuracy with a common percentage for the range of
accuracy for additional and less cost, in reality the cost tends to "creep" towards
additional cost This characteristic of estimating was apparent in the court cases
researched There were no cases in which the cost was less than estimated. The thesis
author's opinion of "cost creep" is shown in Figure 1.
STANDARD CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS
In this section, the requirements of the American Institute of Architects Standard
Agreement Between .Architect and Owner, Document B141, 1987, the Engineer's Joint
Contract Document Committee's Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and
Engineer for Professional Services, Document No 1910-1, 1984. and the Atlantic
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Standard Contract for Architectural-
Engineering Services, Document 5ND LANTDIV 4-4280/7 (8-67), are compared.
A review of the three above mentioned contract procedures shows that AIA B 141
and EJCDC's agreement are very similar in requirements for preliminary estimates, while
the NAVFAC agreement requires a detailed estimate for each phase of design. Since AIA
B141 in many cases parallels EJCDC's agreement in form and content, these documents
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The AJA B141 agreement requires the architect to "submit to the owner a
preliminary estimate of Construction Cost based on current area, volume, or other unit
costs" in the "Schematic Design Phase'" Subsequent adjustments to this preliminary
estimate are required for the "Design Development Phase" and the "Construction
Documents Phase" Similarly, the EJCDC agreement requires an "Engineer's opinion of
probable costs for the project" in the form of "Total Project Costs" in the "Study and
Report Phase
1
', "Preliminary Design Phase", and the "Final Design Phase" Both
documents require approval of the cost prior to proceeding to subsequent phases. Two
minor differences are noted:
1 .AJA B 141 requires a "preliminary estimate of Construction Cost" whereas EJCDC
requires an "Engineer's opinion of probable cost for the project" titled "Total
Project Cost" Additionally, EJCDC specifies the requirement for "a breakdown
of Construction Cost, Engineering costs and contingencies, costs of other
consultants, cost of land, etc
"
2 AJA B141 requires "owner approval" prior to proceeding to a subsequent phase
whereas EJCDC requires "written authorization."
AJA B 141 provides exculpatory language for the responsibility of construction
cost, paragraph 5 2.1 states:
Evaluations of the Owner's Project budget, preliminary estimates of Construction
Cost and detailed estimates of Construction Cost, if any, prepared by the
Architect, represent the Architect's best judgment as a design professional familiar
with the construction industry It is recognized, however, that neither the
.Architect nor the Owner has control over the cost of labor, materials or
equipment, or the Contractor's methods or negotiating conditions. Accordingly,
the Architect cannot and does not warrant or represent that bids or negotiated
prices will not vary from the Owner's Project Budget or from any estimate of




The EJCDC Document provides similar language, and in addition, EJCDC
paragraph 6.2. 1 states:
If prior to Bidding or Negotiating Phase, the Owner wishes greater assurance as to
Total Project or Construction Costs, the Owner shall employ an independent cost
estimator as provided in paragraph 3 9 (EJCDC, 1984).
One significant difference in the contracts, is AIA B141 paragraph 3.4. 10 provides for
"detailed estimates of Construction Cost" under "Optional Additional Services ." There is
no comparable clause in the EJCDC document. The EJCDC attempts to make it clear that
opinions of costs submitted by the engineer are not intended to be as accurate as cost
estimates because most engineers are not qualified to nor wish to assume the responsibility
of cost estimators The owner is required to employ an independent cost estimator if he
wishes greater assurance as to the actual project or construction costs (Clark, 1981)
The exculpatory language in both contracts concerning fixed limits of construction
cost is a direct reflection of the sizable amount of litigation involving this area, the risks of
the design professional associated with fixed limits, and the deliberate attempts by
professional organizations to limit exposure to fixed limits. AIA B141, paragraph 5.2.2,
states:
No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be established as a condition of the
Agreement by the furnishing, proposal, or establishment of a Project budget, unless
such fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by the parties hereto.
If such a fixed limit has been established, the Architect shall be permitted to
include contingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to determine what
material, equipment, component systems and types of construction are to be
included in the scope of the Project and in the Contract Documents, to make
reasonable adjustments in the scope of the Project and to include in the Contract
Documents alternate bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the fixed limit Fixed
limits, if any, shall be increased in the amount of an increase in the Contract Sum
occurring after execution of the Contract for Construction. (AIA, 1987)
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EJCDC parallels this clause with paragraph 6.2.2.2 and paragraph 6.2.2.3. In
addition, paragraph 6.2.2.2 provides for a "ten percent contingency unless another
amount is agreed in writing" for fixed limits.
Concerning the time between design completion and bidding or negotiation, AJA
B141 (paragraph 5.2.3) allows the architect to modify the estimate after 90 days to adjust
for any change in market condition, whereas EJCDC allows for 6 months.
The contracts are also similar with regard to options for the owner when the fixed
limit is exceeded. AJA B141 paragraph 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 state:
If a fixed limit of Construction Cost (adjusted as provided in Subparagraph 5.2.3)
is exceeded by the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Owner shall:
1 give written approval of an increase in such fixed limit,
2 authorize rebidding or renegotiating of the Project within a reasonable time;
3 if the Project is abandoned, terminate in accordance with Paragraph 8 3; or
4 cooperate in revising the Project scope and quality as required to reduce the
Construction Cost. (AJA, 1987)
If the Owner chooses to proceed under Clause 5 2.4 4, the Architect, without
additional charge, shall modify the Contract Documents as necessary to comply
with the fixed limit, if established as a condition of this agreement. (AJA, 1987)
The clause further states that this is the limit of the Architect's responsibility, and that the
architect shall be entitled to compensation for all services performed whether or not the
Construction Phase is commenced (AJA, 1987)
Atlantic Division Navy Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Requirements
In contrast to the preliminary estimates required by AJA B 141 and EJCDC,
NAVTAC requires a detailed cost estimate with each submittal: 35%. 100%, and Final
The specifications require that the estimate detail for each submittal shall be consistent
with the level of design required for that submittal. The specifications state that accurate
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quantity take-off, inclusion of all appropriate Cost Engineering System (CES) systems,
and accurate unit prices are essential (Atlantic Division, NAVFAC, 1993)
For 35% design submittal requirements (comparable to AIA B 141 Schematic
Design Phase), the contract requires in part:
The cost is to be based on a reasonably accurate take-off of materials/systems
consistent with the level of design. For those elements of the project where the
status of design does not permit a reasonably accurate take-off of quantities or firm
pricing of individual items of work, systems unit prices may be used. The use of
lump sum costs are not acceptable. Use of empirical costs shall be minimized
(Atlantic Division, NAVFAC, 1993)
For Military Construction (MILCON) Projects, a Parametric Estimating and
Programming document is prepared for Congress to approve the programming and
appropriation cycles. The document requires an Estimate Summary Sheet and Building
Square Foot Cost Development Sheet with backup information. When a Parametric
Estimating and Programming Document is required, no 35% design submittal is required
Similar to AIA B 141 and EJCDC regarding approval before proceeding to the next
phase of design, NAVFAC states in part:
It is very important that if the estimate indicates that the design exceeds the
allocated funds, the Project Manager be contacted for instructions. (Atlantic
Division, NAVFAC, 1993)
NAVFAC's 100% design requirements can be compared to the end of the AIA
B 1 4 1 Design Development Phase. Unlike AIA B 1 4 1 and EJCDC, NAVFAC '
s
requirement is similar to a Contractor's detailed estimate as described earlier in this
chapter The specifications require the provision of a narrative description of each system
with the estimate, quotations for all items of substantial quantity or cost, price sources
including company name, person contacted, and date of quote should be included There
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are little differences between the requirements of the 100% design submittal and the Final
Design Submittal
In NAVTAC contracts, Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52.236-22 titled.
Design Within Funding Limitations, is provided:
(a) The Contractor shall accomplish the design services required under this
contract so as to permit the award of a contract, using standard Federal
Acquisition Regulation procedures for the construction of the facilities designed at
a price that does not exceed the estimated construction contract price as set forth
in paragraph (c) below. When bids or proposals for the construction contract are
received that exceed the estimated price, the contractor shall perform such
redesign and other services as are necessary to permit contract award within the
funding limitation. These additional services shall be performed at no increase in
the price of this contract. However, the Contractor shall not be required to
perform such additional services at no cost to the Government if the unfavorable
bids or proposals are the result of conditions beyond its reasonable control.
(b) The Contractor will promptly advise the Contracting Officer if it finds
that the project being designed will exceed or is likely to exceed the funding
limitations and it is unable to design a usable facility within these limitations. Upon
receipt of such information, the Contracting Officer shall review the Contractor's
revised estimate of construction cost. The Government may, if it determines that
the estimated construction contract price set forth in this contract is so low that the
award of a construction contract not in excess of such estimate is improbable,
authorize a change in scope or materials as required to reduce the estimated
construction contract price. When bids or proposals are not solicited or are
unreasonably delayed, the Government shall prepare an estimate of constructing
the design submitted and such estimate shall be used in lieu of bids or proposals to
determine compliance with the funding limitation.
(c) The estimated construction contract price for the project described in
this contract is (shown in Appendix A of the specifications). (Federal Acquisition
Regulation 52.236-22, 1984)
Regarding paragraph (c) above, Appendix A of the contract specifications provides the
Project Budget and "Design to" Estimated Construction Cost. It also provides authority
to proceed in design at a cost in excess of the "Design to" Estimated Construction Cost
and requires a contract modification
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This clause provides options for the Contracting Officer and requirements of the
design professional should bids exceed the funding limitations. The specifications further
state that when the cost limit is not met, the design professional requirements, in part, are
as follows:
Evaluate the bids and submit a comparison of cost between the low bid and the
final Architect-Engineer (A/E) estimate. Reasons for major differences, sorted by
specification division, must be stated with a recommendation to award or reject.
This bid analysis must be provided within one week and at no additional cost to the
government. (Atlantic Division, NAVFAC, 1993)
NAVFACs specifications state that "the objective is to develop a final estimate
that will be within 10% (+/-) of the lowest responsible bid."
SYNOPSIS
In summary, the literature indicates that consistencies exist concerning the
accuracy of various types of estimates The accuracy of a preliminary estimate at the point
of a final revision should be close to 10%. This accuracy coincides with the requirements
of AIA B 141 and EJCDCs engineer-owner agreement NAVFACs goal is an accuracy
of 10% but require detailed estimates. This may in some cases be more accurate, but is
more expensive. It will be shown in subsequent chapters that the courts consider an error
above 20% (the high end of what the literature revealed for a preliminary estimate) gross





There are two theories of recovery that are most common among cases involving
inaccurate cost estimates: breach of contract and negligence. The owner or the design
professional can bring a suit for breach of contract. Breach of contract is based on the
duties agreed to by the parties and required by the contract (Miller, 1992, p 3) Owners
can sue the design professional for negligence Negligence, founded in tort law, is
commonly defined as the lack of ordinary care Negligence requires proof that a duty of
care was owed, a breach of that duty occurred, and a relationship between the breach of
duty and resulting measurable damages (Professional Design Insurance Management
Corporation, 1 98 1 ) To prove negligence, the design professional's performance must be
shown to be unconscionable when compared to the acknowledged professional standard;
the "standard of care, skill, and diligence that men in that profession ordinarily exercise
under like circumstances. " Kostohryz v. McGuire, 212 N.W.2d 850 (1973).
BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Kostohryz v. McGuire, 212 N.W.2d 850 (1973), Kostohryz, an owner, sued
for damages under breach of contract. The court cited American Jurisprudence, 2d, which
states in part:
An architect who substantially underestimates, through lack of skill and care, the
cost of a proposed structure, which representation is relied upon by the employer
in entering in the contract and proceeding with construction, may not only forfeit
his right to compensation, but may become liable to his employer for damages.
However, one to whom an architect gives an estimate of cost may not recklessly
proceed to make contracts which make the cost construction far above that




The original cost estimate for the house which McGuire designed was $39,973.
The actual cost for partial construction was $63,863 plus an estimated $20,000 for
completion. The court denied McGuire' s claim for fee recovery and awarded $7,000 in
damages to Kostohryz.
NEGLIGENCE
Pipe Welding Supply Company, Inc. v. Haskell, Conner, and Frost, 96
AD 2d 29 (1983), illustrates the theory of negligence The owner terminated the project
when informed that the bids exceeded the estimated cost by 33% to 45%. The architect
had orally assured the owner that bids were always within 10% to 15% of the estimate
The owner produced expert testimony that the disparity was so great that the architects
had not used skill, knowledge and judgment ordinarily possessed by proficient architects in
the area, however, the opinion was rendered without knowledge of the method of
estimation of any specifics of the project. By not examining the methods of estimation or
the specifics (reasonable person theory), the owner failed to prove negligence
The design professional can sometimes bring suit for recovery of fee based on
quantum meruit. The theory of quantum meruit (sometimes discussed but seldom
conclusive) is based upon benefit accepted or derived for which the law implies a contract
to pay.
A suit may be brought about under various theories of recovery; breach of
contract, negligence, or quantum meruit It will be shown in the following chapters that




ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In analyzing of cases involving inaccurate cost estimates, it is helpful to understand
the rules which are used by the courts in interpreting contracts. Some of the most
prevalent rules used by the courts are as follows (Thomas, 1994):
1. The purpose of interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties. This is
the primary objective of contract interpretation.
2. Secret or undisclosed intentions will not control, only those intentions that are
expressed or are reasonably inferable will prevail.
3. A contract is to be enforced as made or written.
4 The clear and unambiguous language of the contract must not be ignored.
5 The intentions of the parties are best demonstrated by their actions during
performance (actions speak louder than words).
6 A contract must be read as a whole.
7. A proper interpretation is to find harmony among all parts of the contract.
8 No provision or clause is treated as useless.
9 Specific language will control over general language.
10 General disclaimers are given limited weight and will not be allowed to
override clear indications or positive representations, but specific disclaimers
cannot easily be ignored.
One way to analyze liability for inaccurate cost estimates is to classify each case by
the interpretation rule used by the court. The primary rules of interpretation are the plain
meaning rule, patent ambiguity, actions of the parties, and interpretation as a whole
(Thomas and Smith, 1994, p. 4-11). Using the primary rules, Thomas and Smith
developed a decision diagram for disputes involving interpretation (Thomas and Smith,

24
1994, p 8-3). Figure 2 is a modified version for interpretation of disputes involving
inaccurate cost estimates.
PLAIN MEANING
The use of the plain meaning rule is often discussed and argued, however is seldom
conclusive One example where plain meaning is discussed is the case of Stevens v.
Fanning, 207 N.E.2d 136 (1965). The plain meaning and intent of the phrase
"approximate estimated cost" is discussed, however, the court ultimately interpreted the
contract by reading it as a whole. The plain meaning rule states:
Words employed in a contract will be assigned their ordinary meaning
unless it shown that the parties used them in a different sense. (Calamari
andPerillo, 1990).
Although the plain meaning rule "holds a very significant position in the rules
hierarchy", the scope of coverage is limited to a specific word or phrase (Thomas and
Smith, 1994, p 8-2). Courts attempt to establish the meaning of the word or phrase as it
pertains to the custom and usage in industry. The use of the plain meaning rule must be
conclusive If the case involves more than the plain meaning of a specific word or phrase,
then another rule of interpretation must be used.
PATENT AMBIGUITY
Patent ambiguity is similar to the plain meaning rule with respect to significance as
an interpretation rule, but has limited usage in interpreting cases involving inaccurate cost
estimates Patent ambiguity occurs when the ambiguity is so obvious, a contractor has a
duty to inquire (Thomas and Smith, 1994, p 8-4) In over 60 cases studied in this
research, patent ambiguity was not once used as an interpretive rule Perhaps the
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reason is that the contract between the design professional and an owner is by nature
different from the relationship between a contractor and an owner It is unlikely that
patent ambiguity will play a role in the interpretation of future cases involving inaccurate
cost estimates. The rule is ignored, therefore, omitted from the decision flowchart. Figure
2.
ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A significant number of the cases involving inaccurate cost estimates are
interpreted by reviewing the action of the parties during contract performance With
regard to actions of the parties, the appellate judge in Williams Engineering, Inc. v.
Goodyear, Inc., 496 So.2d 1012 (1986) cited Shakespeare:
When we mean to build,
We first survey the plot, then draw the model;
And we see the figure of the house,
Then must we weigh the cost of the erection;
Which if we find outweighs the ability.
What do we then but draw anew the model
In few offices or at least desist to build at all?
(Shakespeare, King Henry IV, pt 2, Act 1 Scene 3).
The rule of practical construction (action of the parties) states.
A reasonable construction of an ambiguous contract by the parties thereto,
although not conclusive, will be considered and accorded great weight, and usually
will be adopted by the courts. (Restatement, 1981, Section 206)
There are several cases where the owner's actions were the cause of the excess
cost, thus eliminating liability for the design professional. It is common for the design
professional to recover the fee when the owner makes changes which substantially
increase the cost, acquiesces to the increased cost, abandons the project, or in some other
wav causes the increase in cost.
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Owner Actions - Ordering Changes
In Bruno v. Gauthier, 70 So. 2d 693 ( 1954), the owner, Gauthier intended to
spend 518,000 on a house designed by Bruno The $18,000 was based on the fact that
Gauthier was certain that she could save four or five thousand dollars by "being her own
contractor" .After discussion of the original ideas for the house, Gauthier required a
number of changes and additions in the plans adding to the cost of the building. When the
plans were received by the Gauthiers, they were completely satisfied except for the cost
No payment was made to Bruno who brought suit to recover the fee for design. The only
figure pertaining to the actual cost was 2 1/2 years after receiving the plans Gauthier
wrote Bruno stating they could not use the plans as bids received were between $24,000
and $35,000 Bruno had complied with the contract The court found that the reason
Gauthier did not construct the house was failure to sell the house which he owned when
the contract was signed.
In Pieri v. Rosebrook, 275 P. 2d 67 (1954), Pieri, a homeowner, brought suit
against the architect, Rosebrook, for damages caused by the actual cost of his home,
$62,192, which exceeded an alleged agreement of maximum cost of $30,000. The
homeowner ordered several major changes which increased the cost during design The
design professional told the owner that the changes would cost more money The owner
paid $50,000 in subcontracts before asking the design professional about costs or
objecting to the costs. This action amounted to accepting the cost overrun The court
found in favor of the design professional
Similarly in Loewy v. Rosenthal, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 496 (1952), Brown v. Cox,
459 S W 2d 471 (1970), and Griswold and Rauma. Architects, Inc. v. Aesculapius
Corp., 221 N.W .2d 556 (1974), the design professional's fee was recovered when owner





565 S.W.2d 281 (1978)
Facts.
Cobb, a homeowner, brought suit alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence in failing to keep cost of designing a home less than $500,000 The
written contract contained no mention of a cost limit. During design, the owner made
several changes which greatly increased the cost. The final plans were originally
estimated to be above $500,000 At the request of the owner, Thomas, the architect,
revised the plans and Sebastian, the owner's builder, confirmed that it could be built for
under $500,000 However, Sebastian refused to build the house on a fixed cost basis, and
the owner awarded the contract on a cost plus contract. After award, the owner suffered
some unexpected financial difficulties and eventually stopped construction for 6 months
Analysis and Conclusion
The court found that that the design professional did not show a lack of due care.
In upholding the trial court's decision, the court found the reasons for excess costs were:
( 1) owners executed a cost-plus contract, (2) owners added extras, (3) owners suspended
work for approximately 6 months due to their own financial difficulties The court found
in favor of the design professional.
Owner Actions - Abandonment
The design professional is entitled to compensation when the owner abandons the
project In the case of Parrish v. Tahtaras, 318 P 2d 642 (1957), the court found in
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favor of Parrish, the architect, because the owner abandoned the project. At the time
Tahtaras abandoned the project, Parrish was in the process of modifying the plans in
accordance with the contract, to reduce the cost from $73,280 to the oral cost condition
of $65,000 Similarly in Mathews v. Neal, Greene, and Clark, 338 S.E.2d 496 (1985),
Mathews, the owner, abandoned the project because the cost was more than originally
contemplated, and refused to pay the design fee There was no cost limit and the architect
followed the owner's requirements in design of the project. The only bid received was far
in excess of the amount Mathews wanted to spend, however, the architect had no
requirement for a cost estimate The court stated:
Where an architect is employed by the owner of land to prepare plans and
specifications for the construction of a building thereon, and does so, and the
owner decides not have the building erected, because of the estimated cost, but
nevertheless retains the plans and specifications, in the absence of any guaranty as
to the cost of the building, or agreement as to his compensation for preparing the
plans and specification, the architect would be entitled to recover the reasonable
value of his services in preparing the plans and specifications (338 S.E.2d 496
(1985))
Abandonment can also be found when a party to a contract breaches the original
contractual obligations and continues the project with another party In Jay Dee Shoes,
Inc. v. OstrofF, 59 A. 2d 738 (1948), the design professional, Ostroff, presented a design
that cost $25,000 to $30,000 In an effort to save money, the owner, stated he would hire
his own superintendent, contractor, and subcontractors. During construction, the owner
contracted with a different design professional to complete the remainder of the work, and
stated that Ostroff was not entitled to the design fee because he did not stay within the
alleged cost limit of $15,000 The court ruled in favor of Ostroff.
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Owner Actions - Acquiescence
When a party to a contract ignores a problem by "burying their head in the sand"
or pretending the problem does not exist, the actions may be construed as acquiescing or
agreeing to the matter. In other words, the failure to object may be construed as
agreement. Actions speak louder than words
Such was the case in Farnet v. Minyard. 383 So. 2d 440 (1980), where Farnet,
the architect, brought suit to recover the design fee for a renovation project. The contract
gave no mention to a cost limitation. Two bids were received; the lowest was $99,961.
Minyard terminated the services of the architect, and claimed that there was a verbal
understanding that costs for the project would not exceed $50,000. During performance,
Farnet sent invoices to Minyard which noted that the estimated cost of construction was
$100,000, and notified Minyard that the estimated cost was $100,000 during a review at
the end of the preliminary design phase just prior to starting the construction documents
phase Minyard stated that he repeatedly told Farnet that he could not borrow or spend
more than $50,000 and that he never agreed to construction costs of $100,000. Because
the design professional submitted invoices on $100,000 and the owner made payments
based on this amount, the court ruled in favor of the design professional
Similarly in Firmin v. Garber, 353 So. 2d 975 (1977), a design professional was
able to recover the design fee after the owner failed to stop design on a project which was
known to exceed the owner's financial capabilities Garber, the owner, contracted with
Firmin to prepare plans and specifications for the construction of a residence The
contract was a standard form AIA contract and contained no written limit. At trial, both
parties conceded that the cost of construction was discussed during the negotiation of the
contract Firmin testified that Garber suggested $60,000 as a goal but that no maximum
was established. Instead, Garber suggested that he could reduce the costs, since he
operated an electrical and air conditioning company Garber testified that the $60,000
amount discussed was a binding cost limitation During the preparation of the plans and
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specifications. Firmin informed Garber that the cost would exceed the cost range sought
Garber made no request to halt the preparation of the plans The lowest qualified bid
received was $105,320 Garber did not object to the plans but requested discussions to
reduce the cost to the $60,000 range. After discussions, Firmin prepared a second set of
plans which drew a bid of $79,240. Garber informed Firmin that he would postpone
building for two years and declined to pay the architect's fee. Firmin invoked arbitration
according to the contract. The arbitrator found for the architect. This decision was
eventually upheld by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Illustrative Example
Moore v. Bolton
480 S.W.2d 805 (1972)
Facts.
Moore contracted with Bolton for design of a residence During design, Bolton,
the design professional, sent a letter requesting Moore's signature specifying that the fee
would be 10% based on the construction cost. The letter contained no cost limit Moore
testified that it was not signed because there was no limit stated, but did not object to
Bolton proceeding with the design. During design, Moore added changes which increased
the cost. The plans were submitted to a builder who estimated the cost at $75,200,
Moore's budget amount. The builders estimate was contingent on 35 deletions from the
original plans At no time during design did Moore stop Bolton's design work despite the
additional work Moore did not agree with any of the deletions that the builder suggested




Moore claimed a cost limit of $75,000, but the court in ruling for the design professional
stated that actions speak louder than words. The court stated.
The fact that the building may have cost more than the owner wanted is not
material where there has been no fixed cost in the contract (480 S.W.2d 805
(1972))
Owner Actions - Miscellaneous
Sweet states that a design professional who does not have flexibility due to
stringent requirements may be less likely to be held liable (Sweet, 1968, p 1006). In
Bueche v. Eickenroht, 229 S.W 2d 911 (1949), Eickenroht, an architect, was able to
recover where Bueche, an owner-builder, specified the size and details of a house, and
stated that he did not want it to exceed $18,000. The design professional could not do
both, and was faced with designing a house for $18,000, or designing a house that Bueche
specified The design was completed with regard to the specifications of the owner but
exceeded the cost $18,000
The owner's actions were paramount in Arata v. Sunseri, 147 So.2d 222 (1962).
Arata entered into a contract with Sunseri to prepare plans to renovate an office building.
The cost limit was $25,000 and the lowest bid was $39,000. The owner subsequently split
the work into several contracts and proceeded with construction. Arata, seeing the work
being done, sued for his fee. The testimony proved that the plans for the work being
performed were essentially the same as what Arata had prepared The court ruled that
while it is true that an architect who fails to furnish plans and specifications substantially
within an agreed cost limit is not entitled to a fee, it is also true that in such a case the
owner cannot make use of the architect's plans without paying a fee
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Design Professional Actions - Designing in Excess of Owner's Requirements
Just as the owner's actions are paramount in showing intent of the parties, so can
the actions of the design professional. Some of the design professional's actions that
proved relevant in this research are:
designing in excess of the owner's requirements
acquiesence
revising the drawings to reduce cost
not adhering to the professional standard of care
accuracy of the estimate
Discussion of several relevant cases follow. A design professional can be held liable for
designing a project substantially different from the owners requirements. Such was the
case in Zannoth v. Booth, 52 N.W.2d 678 (1952) and Bruno v. Williams, 76 So.2d 41
(1954). In the latter case, the architect, Bruno, brought suit to recover his fee for a house
design This was an oral contract. Williams testified that Bruno prepared plans that were
substantially different from what Williams had sketched and substantially exceeded the
maximum stated cost of $30,000. The house was bid for $55,000. The court ruled that
where a limit is set the architect is not entitled to his fee if the plans which he prepares
cannot be constructed except by the expenditure of an amount substantially in excess of
the limit.
Design Professional Actions - Acquiesence
Similar to the cases describing acquiesence by the owner, a design professional's
acquiesence can be construed as intent. In Hirsch v. Kuhne 149 So. 2d 630 (1963),
Hirsch brought suit against Kuhne, an architect, to recover $829 he had paid to Kuhne in
fees for construction of a medical center in Luling, Louisiana. There was no cost limit
written in the contract, but Hirsch claimed the cost was orally agreed not to exceed
$55,000 The low bid was $89,937 Kuhne denied responsibility because the cont act,
adopted from a standard AIA document, states.
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When requested to do so the Architect will furnish preliminary estimates on the
cost of the work, but he does not guarantee such estimates ( 149 So 2d 630
(1963))
Hirsch was introduced to Kuhne by a mutual contractor friend. They discussed
construction of the medical center. The contractor estimated the cost would not exceed
$9/SF yielding a total of 6, 140 square feet. Kuhne did not object or protest to this
estimate and the contract was signed. The low bid was $89,937 Hirsch stated he could
not accept this cost unless it was reduced to $55,000 The low bid was reduced to
$79,760, and Hirsch again refused. Since the contract was silent regarding a cost limit,
the court allowed parol evidence. During design, Kuhne sent statements to Hirsch
expressly stating the estimate cost of construction was $55,000. This was conclusive
evidence. The court held:
An architect, who fails to furnish plans for a building within the agreed cost limit,
is not entitled to his fee, and that parol evidence is admissible to supply omissions
in a written contract with reference to the absence of cost limitation. (149 So.2d
630(1963))
The architect was denied his fee, and Hirsch recovered the fee previously paid.
Design Professional Actions - Revising the Drawings
In standard contracts such as AIA B141 and the EJCDC owner-engineer
agreement, the design professional is required to revise the drawings if the owner so
chooses, at the design professional's expense but with the owner's cooperation. In
Caldwell v. United Presbyterian Church, 180 N.E.2d 638 (1961) , Caldwell was hired
to prepare plans and specifications for a building. There was an oral cost limit of $45,000
The low bid was $57,800. Caldwell testified that tracings of revised plans to reduce cost
within the limit were made, however, there was no proof that blueprints which could
actually be used by the church were ever provided. The court found that the low bid
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substantially exceeded the cost limit and Caldwell did not comply with the contract in
revising the plans.
Design Professional Actions - Standard of Care
The case of Williams Engineering, Inc. v. Goodyear, 496 So. 2d 1012 (1986),
relates to the standard of professional care. In this case, the design professional was held
liable:
not by giving an inaccurate initial estimate, but by failing to employ a
professional estimator, failing to look at other water slides, failing to advise the
owners about other contractual possibilities, and failing to provide revised cost
estimates. (496 So.2d 1012 (1986))
Likewise, in Stanley Consultants, Inc. v. H. Kalicak Construction Co , 383
F Supp 315 (1974), the design professional was hired to prepare a cost estimate for an
apartment building in Zaire The estimated cost was $8 million and the bid amount was
$16 million. The estimate was prepared with little or no market data from Zaire. The
court found that the design professional did not meet the standard of what a reasonable
design professional would have done.
In Kellogg v. Pizza Oven, Inc., 402 P. 2d 633 (1965), the design professional
underestimated cost due to a math error. Suit was brought by the owner against the
architect for failing to design and supervise construction of a restaurant building. The
contract contained a cost limit of $60,000. During construction, the architect approved
various bids for the work without regard to the total amount awarded. There was also
ample testimony that the architect made no attempt to recheck the original estimate, and
when they were requested to supply a detailed cost breakdown, they utilized former
erroneous estimates and made no effort to recalculate their figures. Futher testimony
revealed that if Kellogg's figures had been rechecked, Kellogg would have discovered the
almost 40% excess in costs The architect failed to check the various bids as they came in
and approved them without regard to the total, and the building was more than halfway
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completed before they did so. A check of the bids before the contracts on them were let
would have revealed immediately the cost to be in the area of $90,000 The general rule
describing the duty of an architect is found in 5 Am.Jur.2d., Architects, Section 23, as
follows:
An Architect who substantially underestimates, through lack of skill and care, the
cost of a proposed structure, which representation is relied upon by the employer
in entering in the contract and proceeding with construction, may not only forfeit
his right to compensation, but may become liable to his employer for damages (5
Am Jur 2d, Section 23)
The architect was negligent in the mathematical computations of his estimate
Design Professional Actions - Accuracy of the Estimate
The standard of professional care is an important factor in determining negligence.
Some courts have stated that a design professional cannot recover compensation for his
services if the cost of the building constructed according to his plans exceeds the
maximum limit specified (20 A.L.R. 3d., p 783). More often, courts have established the
rule that a design professional cannot recover compensation for his services if the cost of
the building constructed according to his plans substantially exceeds the maximum limit
specified (20 AIR. 3d., p. 783). The question arises, what amount or percentage
"substantially exceeds" that specified9 American Law Reports has published an
annotation on this subject, which notes.
Although the courts have not formulated any general rules concerning the effect of
the percentage of excess on the right to recover compensation, it seems significant
that the number of decisions denying recovery of compensation on proportion to
the number of decisions allowing recovery increases rapidly as the percentage of




In reference to whether or not a cost condition has been fulfilled. Sweet states that
"'roughly 10% seems to be accepted, although this figure might be reduced if the project
were large and the fee justified continual detailed pricing takeoff" (Sweet, 1994, p 203)
Sweet further states "that the more specific the amount of the cost limitation, the more
likely a small tolerance figure will be applied ." (Sweet, 1994, p. 203) A review of Chapter
2 shows that estimating publications consider an error of 10% to be the degree of
accuracy for the final revision of preliminary estimates (preliminary estimates are required
in standard contracts of AIA and EJCDC) NAVFAC's goal for estimates in contracts
with design professionals is an accuracy of 10 %. The EJCDC contains a 10%
contingency regarding fixed limits, and prior to 1977, AIA B 141, contained a 10% bidding
contingency (Sweet, 1994, p. 203). Furthermore, in providing the design professional with
a self rating system, the Design Professional Insurance Company recommends a poor
rating if a design professional finds that cost estimates are exceeded by more than 10% on
over 20% ofjobs (Design Professional Insurance Company, 1988, p 54).
Although 10% is an estimate that is easily related to and has been mentioned in
standard contract language and estimating publications, the review of decisions in this
research suggest that a more accurate percentage which courts seem to consider gross
negligence is 20%. The court in Kunz v. Torbeck, 31 Ohio L.R. 373 (1928), stated,
"where the cost exceeds by more than 20% the estimate given by the architects, the cost is
not approximately or reasonably near the proposed amount or estimate." 3 1 Ohio L.R.
373 (1928) However, in the case of Griswold and Rauma v. Aesculapius, 221 N.W.2d
556 ( 1974), the court did not find a 13% error substantial, although there were other
relevant factors. A review of the three cases mentioned in American Law Reports where
the design professional was precluded from recovery when the excess was under 25%,
shows the lowest error in which recovery was not allowed was roughly 23% in the case of
Wuellner v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 60 N E 2d 867 (1945). There are several cases which
may be useful in determining the lower limit of error In are Pipe Welding Supply Co. v.
Haskell, Connor, and Frost, 96 AD. 2d 29 (1983), the court stated that a 10 to 25%
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error is common. A 10% variation was considered normal in Kellogg v. Pizza Oven,
Inc., 402 P 2d 633 (1965).
Appendix B. Table B-L lists the cases researched where the percent error could be
calculated from the reporter A review of Table B-l shows that in all of the cases
researched where the error was below 20% (with the exception of the case of Torres v.
Jarmon. 501 S.W.2d 369 (1973), where the changes made in reducing the percent error
to 13% substantially changed the building) the design professional was not held liable.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates design professional liability for inaccurate cost estimates as
a function of the percent error. A review of Figure 3 appears inconclusive, however,
when the cases are removed where the owner's actions caused the increase in cost, shown
in Table B-2 and graphically in Figure 4, the consistency of the courts is apparent. Figure
4 shows when a cost limit is present, a design professional is liable when the error in the


















































































































READ THE CONTRACT AS A WHOLE
To determine the intent of the parties, a court must give consideration to all parts
of an agreement In reviewing the contract as a whole, the court will consider the "four
corners" of the contract. All provisions of the contract should be read to harmonize the
contract such that no part is rendered useless (Thomas and Smith, 1994, p. 4-14). The
rule for interpreting the contract as a whole states:
A contract must be construed as a whole and, whenever possible, effect will be
given to all its parts (5 Am.Jur 2d, Section 25)
There are several cases involving inaccurate cost estimates that have been
interpreted by reading the contract as a whole. In general, there are three types of cases
involving reading the contract as a whole: cases where there is a cost limit written in the
contract (Category I), cases where there is a cost limit established through parol evidence
(Category II), and cases where there is no cost limit (Category III) A list of cases
decided using the rule "interpret the contract as a whole" and the respective category is
shown in Appendix B. Table B-3.
WRITTEN COST LIMITS (CATEGORY I)
Cost limits can be established by written language in the contract (Category I).
When interpreting a contract, a court will first determine (1) if a fixed cost limit existed,
and (2) if meeting the fixed limit was a condition of payment.
An architect may not be entitled to recover his fee where he has failed to design a
project which can be constructed within a cost limitation where failure to comply is
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considered to be a condition precedent to payment. Malo v. Oilman 379 N E 2d
554 (1978), Stevens v. Fanning, 207 N.E.2d 136 (1965), Spitz v. Brickhouse,
123 N.E.2d 117(1954).
As noted earlier, professional organizations such as AIA and EJCDC in their
standard form contracts have attempted to shield themselves from liability resulting from
cost limitations For example AIA B141, paragraph 5.2.2 states:
No fixed limit of Construction Cost shall be established as a condition of the
Agreement by the furnishing, proposal, or establishment of a Project budget, unless
such fixed limit has been agreed upon in writing and signed by the parties hereto
If such a fixed limit has been established, the Architect shall be permitted to
include contingencies for design, bidding and price escalation, to determine what
material, equipment, component systems and types of construction are to be
included in the scope of the Project and to be included in the Contract Documents,
to make reasonable adjustments in the scope of the Project and to include in the
Contract Documents alternate bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the fixed
limit. Fixed limits, if any, shall be increased in the amount of an increase in the
Contract Sum occurring after execution of the Contract for Construction. (AIA,
1987)
In addition, paragraph 5.2.3 provides for ''adjustment by the Architect if negotiation or
bidding has not commenced within 90 days after the Construction Documents have been
submitted to the owner." (AIA B 141, 1987). Paragraph 5 2.4 provides specific options
for the owner where the fixed limit is exceeded by the lowest bona fide bid (AIA, 1987).
Similar language appears in the standard EJCDC owner-engineer agreement. Sometimes
design professionals choose to accept the risk of accepting a fixed cost limit written in the
contract. In Clark v. Madeira, 477 S W.2d 817 (1972), the contract called for designing
plans for renovation of the Madeira's home for "approximately $23,000". The actual job
cost was $43,000 The court stated that Friberg, the architect, who was a partner with
Clark, the builder, could not profit by his own wrong. The court stated:
An architect, whose cost estimate is culpably below the actual cost of the job is not
entitled to a commission upon the excess. (477 S.W 2d 817 (1972))
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The applicable rule concerning fixed limits (established by written language or through
parol evidence) is:
An architect holds himself out as an expert in his particular line of work and is
employed because he is believed to be such, and in making estimates, he may not
be negligent in exercising the skill and judgment which those employing him have
the right to expect; therefore, where plans are required for a building which does
not cost more than a certain sum, or are accepted on condition that it can be
constructed for an amount specified by the architect, he cannot recover
compensation for his services in this regard if the cost of the building constructed
according to his plans, substantially exceeds that specified. (3 Am.Jur.2d, Section
17)
Most of the cases in this research were based on the traditional method of project delivery
Perhaps this case presents how a court might treat a design-build firm (an increasing
method of project delivery with little case history) involved in a cost estimate dispute.
In Stevens v. Fanning, 207 N.E.2d 136 (1965), Fanning, a Chevrolet dealer,
contracted with Stevens to design a building for his dealership The contract provided that
the building was to be "a multiple purpose building suitable to the needs of the owner, at
an approximate estimated cost of $250,000." 207 N.E.2d 136 (1965) The case involved a
misunderstanding about whether the limit applied to a pre-stressed concrete or steel
framed design. The court found that the parties contracted solely for a specific type of
building type (pre-stressed concrete) at a given price, and it is undisputed that the architect
did not produce such building at the agreed price In ruling against the design
professional, the court stated:
There may be no recovery for engineering or architectural services where the
actual cost of the structure substantially or unreasonably exceeds estimated cost




Similarly in Durand Associates, Inc. v. Guardian Investment Co . 183 N.W 2d
246 (1971), Durand, the architect, was bound to a cost limitation which was written in
the contract and was held liable for substantially exceeding the limit.
Illustrative Example
Torres v. Jarmon
501 S.W.2d 369 (1973)
Facts.
Torres, an architect, brought suit to recover his fee for services for design of a veterinary
hospital for "approximately $70,000" The owner, Jarmon, was a traveling salesman.
Jarmon's friend, Fisher, worked closely with Torres in design as Jarmon was going to
lease the facility to Fisher Torres prepared plans and specifications which detailed a
"first-class" veterinary hospital. The low bid for construction was $133,000, which the
court stated "was greatly in excess of the fixed limitation of approximately $70,000." 501
S W 2d 369 (1973). Torres did not question that the low bid was greatly in excess of the
fixed limit. Recovery was sought upon the contract which provided:
The relevant Section in the contract is paragraph 3.5.1, which states in part:
If the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated proposal, the Detailed Cost Estimate, or
the Statement of Probable Construction Cost exceeds such fixed limit of
Construction Cost (including the bidding contingency) established as a condition of
this Agreement, the Owner shall (3) cooperate in revising the Project scope
and quality as required to reduce the Probable Construction Cost In the case of
Option (3) the Architect, without additional charge, shall modify the Drawings and
Specifications as necessary to bring the Construction Cost within the fixed limit
The providing of such service shall be the limit of the Architect's responsibility in
this regard, and having done so, the Architect shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with this Agreement. (501 S.W.2d 369 (1973))
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Fisher chose Option (3) of paragraph 3 5 1 and Torres made 12 to 20 changes in the
original plans that were approved by Fisher Some of these were substantial changes such
as eliminating the second floor The cost was negotiated with the low bidder to $79,000.
The proposal was rejected and the hospital was never built.
Analysis and Conclusion.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in affirming the trial courts decision to deny fee
recovery, stated:
It is settled law in this state that if a positive cost limitation is stipulated in an
architect's employment contract, a substantial violation thereof will preclude
recovery. Here appellants concede that the contract contains a fixed limitation of
"approximately $70,000", and it is undisputed that the bid of $133,000 is a
substantial violation of such limitation (501 S.W.2d 369 (1973))
The remaining question was, Did Torres comply with part (3) of paragraph 3.5.1? By
Torres' own testimony, the plans were modified and the contract amount was reduced to
$79,000 The court stated:
In this situation, it cannot be said that such subsequent proposal fulfilled
appellants' obligations under Option (3) of the contract. In any event, there is no
finding, and we cannot say as a matter of law, that a proposal of $79,000 would be
within the fixed limitation of "approximately $70,000." (501 S.W.2d 369 (1973))
The fact that Torres, the design professional, was able to reduce the percent error
from 90% to 13% and still was precluded from fee recovery appears inconsistent with
several cases. However, the changes to the plans and specifications were substantial. As
a last note, it is worth mentioning that Jarmon never had any contact with Torres, and
Fisher, the potential leasee worked directly with Torres in proposing a "first class facility".
Additionally, Torres admittedly did not know that the contract contained an express cost
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limit. The court ruled in favor of the owner This case presents the importance of
"reading the contract."
COST LIMITS ESTABLISHED THROUGH
PAROL EVIDENCE (CATEGORY U)
When a contract is ambiguous or incomplete, for example when the contract is
silent on cost, the courts may use parol evidence to fill the void. Early versions of the
standard AIA agreement were silent on fixed cost limits, thus parol evidence was used
frequently. A partial list of these cases follows:
Bair v. School District 94, 146 P 347 (1915)
Almand v. Alexander, 23 S.W.2d 61 1 (1930)
Loyal Order of Moose v. Faulhaber, 41 N.W.2d 535 (1950)
Wick v. Murphy, 54 N W.2d 805 (1952)
Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 69 So 2d 367 (1953)
Spitz v. Brickhouse, 123 N E 2d 1 17 (1954)
Caldwell v. United Presbyterian Church, 180 N E 2d 638 (1956)
Recent editions of standard contracts specifically address fixed limits. However, it
is worth noting that no contractual provision, however well drawn, will ensure that the
client will not be able to bring his contention before the court in the form of parol evidence
(Sweet and Sweet, 56 Calif L. Rev. 1005, 1968) The use of parol evidence involves
intangibles such as the judge's opinion and how the evidence is presented. Such
intangibles are beyond the scope of this research as it becomes increasingly difficult for an
owner or a design professional to determine how the courts may view their situation when
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the agreement is oral or based on oral agreements It is worthwhile, however, to review
cases that involve cost limits determined by the use of parol evidence
In Wick v. Murphy, 54 N.W. 2d 805 (1952), the court established a cost limit
through parol evidence. The owner. Murphy, was seriously concerned with the cost of a
renovation project on his home and communicated an $8,500 limit to Wick, the architect
The low bid of $14, 959.80 (75% greater than the maximum) was rejected by the owner
The court stated:
..that it could not be assumed that the parties intended at the time the contract was
executed that the plaintiffs were to receive a fee for their services based upon a
rejected bid substantially in excess of the maximum cost limit (54 N.W. 2d 805
(1952))
The contract contained ambiguous language concerning the basis for payment. The court
stated
If plaintiffs interpretation of the contract were sustained, it would follow that they
would be entitled to a fee based on the lowest bona fied bid received for doing the
work regardless of the amount of the bid or the letting any contract. (54 N.W. 2d
805 (1952))
Paragraph 2 of the Schedule of Professional Practice, which is part of the agreement,
provided that the basic rate would be based upon the total cost of the work completed.
Paragraph 10 defined "cost of work" as the total of the contract sums incurred for the
execution of the work. Since no construction contract was let, the basic rate could not be
determined. The court ruled:
To sustain the plaintiffs meaning would render useless the paragraphs which allow
for computing the basic rate of payment. A basic rule to contract interpretation is
that a contract must be read as a whole thus no clause is to be rendered useless
(54 N.W 2d 805 (1952))
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Wick, the architect, was not able to recover the design fee. Two other cases which
contain the same situation and similar contract language regarding payment are Loyal
Order of Moose v. Faulhaber. 41 N.W 2d 535 (1950), and Wetzel v. Roberts, 295
N.W. 580, (1941).
In the case of Durand Associates, Inc. v. Guardian Investment Co., 183
N.W 2d 246 (1971), the owner, after being presented with a contract which contained the
statement "Cost Estimate $629,000", called the architect on the phone and stated, "This
building is to be built for $420,000 as previously discussed." The design professional
agreed there had been an error and the contract was changed to $420,000 The architect
testified that the figure was a preliminary figure for payment. The owner testified that it
was a cost limit. No other discussions of cost were mentioned. The court, in ruling for the
owner, stated:
It strains credulity to believe any businessman or private corporation would enter
into a substantial building project without insisting on some estimate of cost. (183
N.W.2d 246 (1971))
In cases involving oral agreements parol evidence, the decision rests with the court by
weighing what is many times conflicting testimony by the parties. In Rock v. Enelow,
292 So 2d 756 (1974), Rock, an architect, entered into an oral contract with Enelow to
build a two story apartment building. Enelow testified that there was a maximum cost of
$100,000 including fees, and that the fee was contingent on the cost. Rock testified that
he never agreed to this condition and the fee was a percentage of cost, non-contingent
The low bid was $1 15,000 Rock sued for 3/4 of 4 1/2% of the low bid, $1 15,000 (since
his services also included construction monitoring and this was not accomplished) The
court ruled that the fee was not a contingent fee, however, a cost condition of $100,000
did exist The court awarded Rock the design fee
Similarly, in the case of Rowell v. Crow, 209 P 2d 149 (1949), parol evidence
was used to establish a cost limit. Rowell entered into an oral agreement to design plans
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for a hotel renovation project for Crow Crow testified that payment was conditioned on
a maximum amount of $250,000 based on his ability to borrow only $125,000, and "if
Rowell could prepare plans within this amount then he could proceed." When the lowest
bid was received in the amount of $598,819, Crow refused to proceed Rowell
contended that there was no proof of the cost limit. The jury believed the testimony of
Crow-
In Rosenthal v. Gauthier, 69 So. 2d 367 (1953), a heavily cited case, Rosenthal
appealed for recovery of fee for design of a one story masonry clinic and hospital. The
contract was an standard form of agreement issued by the American Institute of
Architects, and was silent with regards to a cost limitation The trial judge allowed parol
evidence to determine the intent of the parties with regard to a cost limitation. Gauthier
testified that there was a verbal agreement and understanding as to a cost limitation of the
building beginning at $60,000, and being progressively raised after numerous discussions
to $100,000, including architects and contractor's fees. Rosenthal denied emphatically
that there was any cost limitation. When the bid was received for $123,490, Gauthier told
Rosenthal that $100,000 was his top limit and that the deal was off if he could not reduce
the price The judge weighed the testimony provided by both parties and ruled in favor of
the owner, Gauthier. Similar decisions were reached in the following cases:
Eberhard v. Mehlman, 60 A 2d 540 (1948)
Goldberg v. Underbill, 213 P 2d 516 (1950)
Tsoi v. Ebenezer Baptist Church, 153 So 2d 592 (1963)
Spurgeon v. Buchter, 192 Cal. App.2d 198 (1961)







Spitz, an architect, brought suit against Brickhouse for recovery of the design fee
of $2,675 for designing a house. The contract was silent as to the style, number of rooms,
dimensions, the quantity, and quality of materials. Brickhouse and his wife met with Spitz
at the proposed lot. Brickhouse asked Spitz if he could build a five and a half or six-room
house, ranch style, if Brickhouse provided the lot, for $25,000. Spitz answered, "I believe
so, yes; and we can make it a beauty." At a later conference, Spitz asked for a retainer of
$250, 10 percent of the fee. Spitz presented a contract. Brickhouse asked what it meant
and Mr Spitz answered, "It means that when you build a house, we are your architects.
This is to keep you from changing horses in the middle of the stream." Brickhouse
repeated that the cost of the house was not to exceed $25,000 Spitz said that was correct
and when the house was built our fee will be $2,500 Brickhouse testified that when he
was informed that the house would cost from $39,000 to $44,000 he told Spitz he could
not finance such a home. Spitz denied ever discussing a maximum cost.
Analysis and Conclusions.
Because the contract was silent regarding the maximum cost, the court used parol
evidence to determine that there was indeed a condition of maximum cost of $25,000
The court found:
that to sustain Spitz' contention that the cost is to be determined by the lowest
bona fide bid, it would be necessary to hold that no matter how large the bid for
doing the work, the owner would be obligated to pay an architectural fee based on
that amount. (123 N.E. 2d 117(1954))
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The written language of the contract renders this testimony of doubtful credibility. The
contract provided that the fee should be "computed on a reasonable estimated cost."
Unless some "reasonable estimated cost" had been agreed upon, it would render
meaningless the "basic rate" for the determination of the architect's fee. In reading the
contract as a whole, the court harmonized the contract. The rule "no clause is rendered
useless" was applied.
Statutory Regulations and Funding Limitations
Government regulations and statutory funding limitations can become part of the
whole agreement when the design fee is contingent on such limitations. A design
professional performing services for NAVFAC must comply with the Design Within
Funding Limitation clause (Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.236-22, 1984). Similar
requirements might also be found in state and local government projects Such was the
case in Beacham v. Greenville County, 62 S.E. 2d 92 (1950). Beacham, an architect,
was hired by Greenville County to prepare plans to remodel and expand the courthouse
The contract was silent to cost. The County was limited by statute and authority to
$400,000. The architect was aware of this funding limitation. During design, the architect
reported that he thought the work could be done for $400,000. The low bid was
$863,000. The architect sued for a fee based on $863,000. The court cited 127 A.L.R.
413 in stating:
Where an architect is employed by the state or by a political subdivision thereof, it
has generally been held that he may not recover compensation for preparing plans
for a structure which will cost more to erect than such governmental unit is
permitted by law to expend for the purpose. (A.L.R. , Section 127, p. 413)
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NO COST LIMIT (CATEGORY in)
The cases in the first two sections of this chapter deal with cases that were decided
fundamentally by reading the contract as a whole, and where a cost limit was established
as a condition of payment. But how have the courts viewed inaccurate cost estimates in
cases where there was no cost limit stated in the contract, any discussions of a cost limit,
or any meeting of the minds concerning cost of the project?
The court looked to the wording of the contract in Jetty, Inc. v. Hall-McGuff
Architects, 595 S W.2d 918 (1980) The court found that the parties had not agreed on a
fixed limit, and that the contract, a standard form AIA, stated that any cost limit must be
in writing. The design professional gained approval of and provided revised estimates as
required by the contract The court stated:
The fact that the building may have cost more than the owner wanted is not
material where there has been no fixed cost in the contract (595 S.W 2d 918
(1980))
The percent error is not known, however, the design professional gained approval of
revised estimates from the owner at the various phases of design.
The design professional was also able to recover the fee in Kahn v. Terry, 628
So. 2d 390 (1993), where the contract stated cost limits must be in writing, and there was
no such evidence of a written cost limit. The percent error in the estimate was 37%. It
should be noted that there appears to be a math error in the case report. The percent error
can also be calculated as 2%.
Likewise in Moossy v. Huckabay, 283 So. 2d 699 (1973), it was determined that
the written language was complete During design, Moossy, an architect, presented
Huckabay with revised estimates, the last of which was $499,216. Huckabay was
commendatory of Moossy and expressed satisfaction. The contract stated that in the
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event that no "acceptable" bids were received, he was to receive 7% of 75% of the
estimated construction cost The low bid was $821,018, an error of 74% The plans and
specifications were revised to an estimated cost of $472,000, however, the contractor who
was the low bidder advised Huckabay that the revisions were impractical. Huckabay
terminated the contract with Moossy, and hired another designer. Moossy, who claimed
for 7% of 75% of $821,018 recovered his fee based on the final estimate of $499,216.
Despite the written language in this contract, it should be noted that there was a dissenting
opinion in this case that has merit based on the amount being "materially in excess" of the
amount specified.
In Kleinschmidt, Brassette, and Associates, Inc. v. Ayres, 368 So 2d 1 153
(1979) the question was raised, Does the design professional have a duty to inform the
owner of his estimate of final cost where there is no agreed upon cost limitation or no
requirements for providing an estimate9 Kleinschmidt brought suit to recover fees under
an oral contract for architectural services rendered to Ayres in connection with a proposed
construction of a residence. In weighing the evidence, the court concluded that the proof
fell short of establishing that there was a meeting of the minds on the architectural fee or
how it was to be computed, and that the anticipated cost of constructing the house was
not mentioned at any time before the plans were completed.
Ayres was satisfied with the completed plans until she received her first
construction bid of $145,000. Later Kleinschmidt got another bid for $125,000 or
$129,000. Shortly thereafter, Ayres went on vacation and lost interest in the project.
Ayres contended that Kleinschmidt could not recover any fees as they failed to advise her
of the final cost of construction The court cited a few landmark cases:
Where an architect is employed to prepare plans and specifications for a building
and there are no cost limitations agreed upon, such architect can recover
compensation for his services irrespective of the costs of construction. Moossy v.
Huckabay Hospital, Inc
,
(283 So 2d 699 (1973))
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If no cost limitations are agreed upon, the architect has no obligation to inquire
into or to keep himself informed of his clients financial status Guirey, Srnka,
and Arnold, Architects v. City of Phoenix, (449 P 2d 306 (1969))
In ruling the court stated:
The defendant's contention that she has not received any benefit from the house
plans is not well taken. She accepted the final plans and they were submitted to
two contractors, who bid on the construction of the home Although Ayres said
that both bids greatly exceeded the amount which she expected to spend,
apparently such figures were not prohibitive and beyond all consideration because
she stated that she still may build the home in the future. (368 So.2d 1 153 (1979))
The interpretation in Baylor v. Carlander, 316 S W 2d 277 (1958), was based on
the clear and unambiguous language of the contract. The design professional was not held
liable where the contract contained no cost limitation and where a cost limitation was
intentionally excluded by the parties. Carlander, an architect, sued for services in
designing a Bible Building, and recovered his fee. Carlander was aware that Baylor only
had approximately $600,000 for the project, and knew his design was greater than
$600,000 (his estimate was approximately double in cost) Moreover, he was designing
to previously approved preliminary plans and specifications. The contract was written
such that Carlander had no obligation to design the building considering cost, and was
only required to provide an estimate when requested to do so The University never
requested an estimate and Carlander did not disclose one Carlander recovered the design
fee.
Similarly, the design professional was able to recover the design fee in
Getzschman v. Miller Chemical Co., Inc., 443 N W 2d 260 (1989) The owner,
contracted with the architect, Getzschman, to design a house There was no cost limit in
the contract The owner requested numercus changes which increased the cost, however,
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relieved the architect from performing cost estimates in exchange for more frequent site
visitations during construction. The owner had planned to hire a contractor friend to
estimate the cost but did not until the design was complete Just prior to bid. while at
lunch with the owner, the architect orally "guessed" a cost 100% lower than the
subsequent bid amount Because there was no limit in the contract, and Getzschman had
no duty to estimate the cost, the court ruled against the owner and awarded Getzschman
the design fee.
In Kurz v. Quincy Post 37 American Legion, 283 N E 2d 8 (1972), there was
no cost limit in the contract. The Legion Post contracted with Kurz, an architect, to
design a Legion Building. Preliminary plans were drawn and Kurz estimated costs at
$100,000 The Legion requested changes to allow for a renter to use the building
resulting in a revised estimate of $122,000. Kurz then discovered soil problems and
proposed three options ranging in cost from $130,000 to $23 1,000. After the Legion
chose an option, the estimate was revised to $150,000 to $160,000 The low bid was
$205,000, and the architect in working with the contractor reduced the bid to $182,000.
The Legion decided not to move forward with the project. Parol evidence was introduced
and it was determined that there was not an agreed to maximum cost. The court found in
favor of the architect who recovered his fee.
SYNOPSIS
Reading the contract as a whole is an important rule of interpretation Several
cases have been presented where this rule was used. Table B-3 Figure 5 shows three
cases where the design professional was not liable and the percent error was greater than
20% In all three cases, there was no cost limit. In the cases, Kahn v. Terry, 628 So.2d
390 (1993), 37% difference, Moossy v. Huckabay Hospital, Inc., 283 So. 2d 699
(1973), 74% difference, and Getzschman v. Miller Chemical Co., Inc., 443 N.W.2d 260
(1989), 100% difference, the written language of the contract stated that any fixed limit
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must be in writing. There was no written evidence of any such agreement The courts
held in favor of the design professionals. It has been stated:
Where the cost of construction is not fixed in the agreement employing an
architect, nor estimated by him, but the plans are prepared according to details
dictated by the owner, it has been held that the fact that the plans when completed
call for a building which will cost more to erect than the owner expected, or
willing, to pay, will not preclude the architect from recovering compensation for
his services in making the plans. (3 Am.Jur , Section 13, p. 219)
It is also noted that these contracts were not silent on the issue of cost limits but
specifically address the issue A court cannot ignore the clear and unambiguous language
of the contract. When the contract is silent on cost, the courts will fill the void by using
parol evidence to establish a limit. In this case, the design professional will be held liable
(barring other factors), for errors greater than 20%, however, when there is no cost limit,
the design professional will not be liable. Although it appears as though the design
professional may be given more flexibility with regard to error when there is no cost limit
in the contract, this does not preclude liability if negligence can be proven by method of
estimating or otherwise.
When there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a contract, the court as a
last resort after all other rules have been exhausted will, as a consequence, rule against the
drafter (Patterson, 1964) Ruling against the drafter is frequently discussed however
seldom applied. With regards to inaccurate cost estimates, the consequence of "ruling
against the drafter" has been cited in Wick v. Murphy, 54 N W 2d 805 (1952) and Spitz
v. Brickhouse, 123 N.E. 1 17 (1954). However, a careful reading of these cases reveals
that although the judge discussed this action, the decision was based on "reading the
contract as a whole". In the case of Wick v. Murphy, 54 N W 2d 805 (1952), the rule
"no clause is rendered useless" was prevalent In Spitz v. Brickhouse, 123 N.E. 1 17


























































Guirey, Srnka, and Arnold Architects, Inc. v. The City of Phoenix
449 P.2d 306 (1960)
This illustrative example demonstrates the use of the interpretation decision diagram,
Figure 2
Facts.
The City of Phoenix contracted to design a stadium. The contract was silent
concerning a cost limitation and there were no oral agreements. The owner's funding
situation changed several times during design, but was originally around $750,000 The
architect's original estimate was $83 1,398, and later revised to $963,978. The owner
requested the architect make changes to the design to reduce the cost. The architect was
able to reduce the cost down to $918,478 Although the owner knew the cost was over
$168,000 more than the funds available, the decision was made to accept bids since as the
City stated, "they were still dealing with estimates." Bids were received and the lowest
bid was $790,282. The owner requested the architect revise the plans to a maximum cost
of $532,300, another new amount of available funds. After the parties were unable to
reduce the cost to an acceptable amount, the owner requested the architect design a new
stadium, which was eventually built
The architect sued for the amount of effort required for designing both stadiums
The owner contended that the second stadium design was a revision of the first stadium,
and that the architect was required to make revisions without additional compensation




Do the terms have plain meaning? The rule is not applicable in this case
Do the actions of the parties show mutual understanding or cause the excess? No.
The City of Phoenix understood the design of the new stadium to be a revision of the
original proposal (which was unacceptable to the owner) and required by the contract.
The design professional designed the new stadium with the understanding that there would
be additional compensation.
Read the contract as a whole. Was there a cost limit? No There was no cost limit
established in writing or by parol evidence The City revised the requirements several
times because of their funding situation, which amounted to the design professional trying
to "hit a moving target"
Was the design professional otherwise negligent regarding the cost estimate? No
The design professional followed the contract and performed the requirements in a
professional manner.
Is there one logical conclusion? Yes The reason the original stadium submittal was
unacceptable to the owner was not because of the design professional, but because the
owner's funding situation changed The owner did not provide clear instructions
regarding cost.
The appellate court ruled that where there was no maximum cost condition, the
architect was entitled to compensation for his services. The court cited Texas Delta
Upsilon Foundation v. Fehr, 307 S W 2d 124 (1957), which stated:
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Unless the architect is given clear instructions with regard to maximum cost, it is
not the architect's province to keep himself informed as to the financial ability of
his client. (307 S.W. 2d 124 (1957))
The court further stated:
If we were to affirm the lower courts ruling we would be saying in effect that all a
city has to do to avoid compensating an architect under Arizona law is to find that
the proposal is unsatisfactory Such a ruling would allow cities to hire architects at
will to design any number of speculative buildings, but avoid compensating the
architect when the city determines there is not enough funds to pay for the
construction even though they were aware that the estimated cost was above the
funds available. An owner should use judgment in a reasonable manner before





This chapter includes a summary, conclusions, and recommendations for future
research regarding design professional liability for cost estimates
Summary of Chapters
Chapter one is an introduction to disputes involving cost estimates. The chapter
provides the problem statement, objective, and methodology used to accomplish the
research The problem is there is not a clear understanding of cases involving inaccurate
cost estimates. The objective is to define the conditions and relevant factors under which
a design professional can be held liable to an owner for inaccurate cost estimates The
method used to accomplish the tasks is the study of literature, standard contracts, and
appellate court cases.
Chapter two defines different types of cost estimates and compares the accuracy
associated with each type The requirements for cost estimates of standard contracts of
AIA, EJCDC, and NAVFAC are compared. The different types of estimates in order of
increasing accuracy are screening/planning, order of magnitude, preliminary, budget,
conceptual, definitive, detailed, and engineer's estimate. The accuracy ranges from 40% to
less than 5% error
In comparing the standard contract documents, AIA B141 and the EJCDC Owner-
Engineer agreement were similar in requirements. However, the NAVFAC standard
contract requires detailed estimates whereas AIA B141 and the EJCDC contract require
only preliminary estimates. In AIA B141, detailed estimates are an optional additional




Chapter 3 explains the theories of recovery for disputes involving inaccurate cost
estimates: breach of contract and negligence Breach of contract is based on the duties
agreed to by the parties and required by the contract (Miller, 1992, p. 3). Both an owner
and design professional can bring suit for breach of contract.
Negligence relates to the professional standard, and is commonly defined as the
lack of ordinary care (Professional Design Insurance Management Corp
, 1981, p. 8) To
prove negligence, the design professional's performance must be shown to be
unconscionable when compared to the professional standard. The design professional can
bring suit for recovery of fee based on quantum meruit. The theory of quantum meruit is
based upon benefit accepted or derived for which the law implies a contract to pay. When
an owner is able to use the plans prepared by the design professional for construction, the
design professional's claim for recovery based on quantum meruit is strengthened because
benefit may be shown. The theory in which the suit is brought is dependent primarily on
the intent of the contractual language and actions of the parties.
Chapter 4 establishes the primary rules for interpretation of disputes involving
inaccurate cost estimates: plain meaning, patent ambiguity, actions of the parties, read the
contract as a whole, and rule against the drafter. The chapter outlines cases that were
decided by the actions of the parties and discusses the percent error that courts have
determined to be gross negligence of the design professional. The chapter also defines
the percent error which constitutes gross negligence as stated by the courts, and the
conditions and relevant factors under which a design professional can be held liable for
cases involving cost limits.
Although standard contracts and literature frequently mention 10% error as an
acceptable accuracy, a review of court decisions suggest that 20% error constitutes gross
negligence when there is an established cost limit.
Chapter 5 examines cases that have been decided based on the rule 'read the
contract as a whole" The cases are classified into three categories: written cost limits
(Category I), cost limits established through parol evidence (Category II), and no cost
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limit (Category III) A discussion is provided on cost limits and parol evidence Unlike
when there is a cost limit, the courts have not held design professional's liable for an
inaccurate estimate when there is no requirement to design to a maximum cost. Several
cases rely on the written language in the contract pertaining to fixed limits. Although the
research shows where there was no fixed limit the design professional was not held liable
for an inaccurate estimate, it reasons that there could be liability based on negligence.
Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the "rule against the drafter", and
provides a decision diagram for interpreting disputes involving inaccurate cost estimates
Conclusions
The two primary rules of interpretation that were used most frequently to interpret
cases involving inaccurate cost estimates are: (1) actions of the parties, and (2) read the
contract as a whole. The existence of a cost limit in the contract which is a condition of
payment, written or established through parol evidence, is paramount. Courts have been
reluctant to hold a design professional liable on the basis of percentage of error as alone
factor, however a 20% error seems to constitute gross negligence on the part of the design
professional when the contract contains a cost limit. In cases where there was no cost
limit, but the contract specifically addressed a cost limit, the clear and unambiguous
language of the contract cannot be ignored. It is noted that this study was based on
appellate level court cases only, which causes some built in bias. Many cases involving
inaccurate cost estimates are not reported For example, AIA provides for arbitration
before prior to a court resolution Furthermore, many cases are simply not appealed
One important aspect of disputes involving cost estimates that was noted was the
concept of "scope creep" In numerous cases, as the design progressed, the estimate
increased There were no cases that were to the contrary Additionally, there were no
cases where the design professional was sued for overestimating the cost.
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Standard contracts have attempted, with some success, to shield the design
professional from liability through the use of exculpatory language, however, it cannot be
relied upon As shown by this research, actions of the parties and reading the contract as
a whole is paramount in determining liability
Recommendations for Future Research
The following topics are recommendations for future research:
1 Most cases in this research involve the Traditional Method of project delivery,
however. Construction Management and Design-Build delivery systems are frequently
used The Construction Manager and Design-Builder have assumed cost estimating
duties in some situations. Are they held to the same standard as design professionals9
Appendix A provides a brief summary concerning liability of Construction Managers,
however, the research is inconclusive.
2. Some recent cases have considered the method that the design professional used to
prepare the estimate. The study of estimating methods in this research was based on
estimating publications. A survey of design professionals in industry would help to
pinpoint the industry standard pertaining to accuracy and methodology, and help
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PERCENT ACCURACY FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF ESTIMATES
Author Type of Estimate % Accuracy (+/-)
Clark et al., 1997 Screening 40
Neil, 1982 Early planning 40
Sinclair, 1989 Order of magnitude 35
Pilcher, 1994 Order of magnitude 25
Merritt, 1975 Magnitude 20 to 25
O'Brien, 1985 Concept or Budget 20
Clark et al., 1997 Budget 20
Merritt, 1975 Conceptual 15 to 20
Sinclair, 1989 Preliminary 18
Pilcher. 1994 Preliminary 15
Merritt. 1975 Preliminary 13 to 15
Ahuja and Walsh, 1983 Preliminary 10 to 15
Sinclair, 1989 Definitive -10to+ 14
Merritt, 1975 Definitive lOto 13
Pilcher, 1994 Detailed 10
O'Brien, 1985 Detailed 5 to 10
Sinclair, 1989 Detailed 5 to 10
Neil, 1982 Definitive 5
Ahuja and Walsh, 1983 Detailed 5
Steven, 1995 Detailed 5
Halpin, 1985 Engineer's estimate 3 to 5




RANGE OF ACCURACY FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF ESTIMATES
Type of Estimate Percent Range of Accuracy (+/-)
Screening/Planning 30 to 40
Order of magnitude 20 to 35
Conceptual/Budget 15 to 20
Preliminary 10 to 18
Definitive 5 to 14
Detailed < 5 to 10



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* CM CO * LO CO r-~ CO CO o
^



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































O CN CO <cf to CO co en o





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*~ CN c*> 1* I to 1 co 1 r*» i ootoio; t- cm ! co i *
I





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0) 0) D J) J)
u cd v aj cu
e *^ i «* *^ — *—
s ^— 1 ^— — ^— < *«M ' *~~
2 o O O OiOiO
i & 2M &! c? 1 £• CT
<u CD ! <D CD CD 0)
> ;>!>>>!> >
o o o o o o
o o o o o o
09 CD 0) 0) 0) a>
u_ 1 u| CI CI C •—
o 2> o ; o! o o o
z £ : zz;z!z:z
CM o ico co en co
o *• 00 t- t- CO ICO












































CM CM o CO












































o CD CO o co
<i* CD N K h-











X X X X X X X X
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LIABILITY OF A CONSTRUCTION MANAGER FOR COST ESTIMATES
The following is a review of AIA Document B801/CMa, Standard Form of
Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager, 1992 Edition.
A review of the relevant paragraphs of AIA B801/CMa identifies similar language
regarding cost estimates as contained in AIA B 14 1 The contract requires the
Construction Manager to provide estimates based on 'volume, area, or other conceptual
estimating techniques." Like the design professional, the Construction Manager is
required to provide the estimates for the architect's review and the owner's approval at
various intervals. Furthermore, the Construction Manager is required to "advise the
owner and architect if it appears that the Construction Cost may exceed the latest
approved Project Budget and make recommendations for corrective action."
In summary, AIA Construction Manager document is similar to the AIA B141
document with regards to cost estimating requirements. Despite the similar contractual
protection, the courts may still find construction managers responsible for cost overruns
(Lee, 1993). Although no specific court cases involving construction managers were
included in this research, the duties responsibilities, and potential liabilities appear to be
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GUIDE TO MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR COST ESTIMATES
I Reduce all agreements to writing and use standard form contracts whenever possible
Use AIA Document B162 as a guide for preparation of the "Statement of Probable
Construction Cost." (AIA B 162, 1987)
2. The owner should understand that you are providing only an estimate of construction
cost, not a guarantee nor a fixed limit. If the client wants more, discuss providing a
detailed cost estimate as an optional additional service, or suggest that the client hire a
cost consultant to give specific, detailed advice If preparing preliminary estimates,
advise the owner at the end of each phase of design of any adjustments to the
preliminary estimate of construction cost. Even if there are no changes, confirm this in
writing with the owner (Heuer, 1987).
3 Devote the same careful planning and time to the cost estimate that is given to design
of a system Assess estimating accuracy If 20% or less of the project estimates are
not exceeded, the assessment is "good". If these cost estimates were not exceeded by
more than a few percentage points, the assessment is "very well" If the cost estimates
were exceeded by more than 10% on over 20% of the projects, the assessment is
"poor" (Design Professionals Insurance Company, 1988, p 54).
4. Avoid common estimating errors such as time of construction (cost and schedule are
linked), quantity takeoff errors, math errors, miscalculation of indirect cost (i.e.
equipment selection), construction method, unit price errors, and site evaluation (ex.
water table) (Paek, 1993, pp 30-33).
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5 If using an owner prepared contract, use AIA B141 and the list of exclusions in a
professional liability insurance policy as a checklist. This can alert design professional
to areas of uninsured risk (Kornblut, 1978, p 59)
The following additional recommendations are offered by the author
6 Educate the owner on the accuracy of estimates and go over the contract. This will
help to adjust the owner's expectations, eliminate the perception that a guaranteed
maximum exists, and help the owner to understand the contract Do not make
promises or guarantees regarding the accuracy of estimates.
7. Identify your risks, and evaluate the in-house capabilities based on the project type
and experience If the project is beyond the expertise of the firm or is of an unfamiliar
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